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Abstract
Multi-sided platforms are omnipresent in today’s digital world. However, establishing a platform includes challenges: The
platform utility usually increases with the number of participants. At an early stage, potential participants expect the platform
utility to be low and lack an incentive to join (i.e., “chicken and egg” problem). Blockchain-enabled utility tokens hold the
promise to overcome this problem. They supposedly provide a suitable financial incentive for their owners to join the platform as
soon as possible. In the first half of 2018, investors seemed to believe in the presumption and spent more than US$ 17.6 billion in
token sales. To date, we know little about this financial incentive in the context of the token economy. For this purpose, we model
the token value development and the associated incentives in a multi-sided blockchain-enabled platform. The resulting findings
suggest that blockchain-enabled utility tokens can help to overcome the “chicken and egg” problem. However, these tokens lead
to contradictory incentives for platform participants, and can even inhibit platform usage. The contribution of our work is
twofold: First, we develop one of the first models for token value development. Second, our research contributes to a deeper
understanding of the utility token’s financial incentive.
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JEL classification G15 . G23 . O33
Introduction
Multi-sided platforms (MSPs) such as Amazon, Uber, or
Airbnb are among the most important players within the glob-
al economic activity. According to a survey by “The Center
for Global Enterprise”, in 2016, 160 MSPs existed, compris-
ing a total market cap of US$ 1.1 trillion (Evans and Gawer
2016). MSPs, also referred to as “matchmakers”, act as an
intermediary bringing together two or more sides of the mar-
ket, typically sellers and buyers (Armstrong 2006; Rochet and
Tirole 2003). Thus, MSPs create value by reducing search
costs and shared transaction costs (Hagiu 2007). This value
depends on the size of the platform, as the utility a participant
derives from using the platform depends on the number of
other participants on the platform. The well-known network
effects describe this phenomenon (Katz and Shapiro 1985;
Liebowitz and Margolis 1994).
Once the platform reaches a critical mass of users, these
network effects take effect and accelerate platform growth
(Evans 2014; Oren and Smith 1981), enabling a completely
new path for growth to companies (Shapiro and Varian 1999).
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Therefore, developing platform business models became a
focus topic for many companies in the past few years.
However, the first platform users experience low platform
utility, which is why potential users lack the incentive to join
the platform at an early stage. Especially in two-sidedmarkets,
buyers have little incentive to join a platform if no sellers are
present and vice versa, which is also called the “chicken and
egg” problem (Caillaud and Julien 2003). A company that
intends to establish a platform has to overcome this problem,
which is an expensive and slow endeavour since a suitable
incentive for early platform adopters is necessary (Evans
2009).
In recent years, a new technology emerged that may be able
to change the incentives for platform participation and to over-
come the initial “chicken and egg” problem: the blockchain
technology. Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the blockchain in
2008 in a publication on a peer-to-peer electronic cash system,
the bitcoin blockchain (Nakamoto 2008). It has since been
adopted and further developed to fit a variety of use cases,
such as blockchain-based platforms. The entity that builds
up a blockchain-based platform can consist of one or many
individuals, companies, or organizations. Some examples of
these platforms include Ethlance, a marketplace for jobs (Urgo
et al. 2017), Golem, a marketplace for computing power
(Zawistowski et al. 2016), or DataBroker, a marketplace for
sensor data (van Niekerk and van der Veer 2018). The entity
behind the platforms issues its own blockchain-enabled token
(Bachmann et al. 2019; Fridgen et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018).
So far, various token designs enable different applications.
One token type is the “utility token”, which represents the
right to access the offered products or services on the platform
(ICOscoring 2018). In the blockchain context, we refer to this
representation as tokenization (Dale 2018).
Currently, the blockchain community ascribes many posi-
tive characteristics to utility tokens. In the following, we de-
scribe the presumptions the blockchain community makes in
blogs and whitepapers regarding a postulated financial incen-
tive of utility tokens and its impact on platform development.
Utility tokens are seen as the de facto means of payment on the
platform (Wesley 2018; Wilmoth 2018). Before the launch of
the platform, the entity issues the tokens at a certain price and
uses the proceeds of the sale as an alternative funding to fi-
nance the platform development (Chuen et al. 2017; Ehrsam
2016a). The issuing entity promotes the token sale with the
prospect of an increase of the token value. It states that rising
numbers of platform participants lead to an increase in
demand for the tokens. As the entity limits the supply
of tokens, an increase in demand is then said to lead to
a higher token value (Karnjanaprakorn 2017; Wesley
2018). Hence, buying tokens earlier provides a financial
incentive since the token value presumably increases.
Thus, the characteristic of the tokens is not only re-
stricted to a means of payment, but they are also seen
as an investment vehicle (Aru 2018), supposed to give
early adopters a compensation (Karnjanaprakorn 2017).
Based on this presumptions, the blockchain community
draws the following conclusions: The potential financial gain
from investing early into tokens can reflect a suitable financial
incentive to overcome the above-mentioned “chicken and
egg” problem (Dixon 2017; Ehrsam 2016a). Potential users
follow the incentive to become an early part of the platform
and benefit from platform growth, e.g., profit from the increas-
ing token value. This permanent token value upside potential
is associated with positive effects on platform growth: the so-
called token network effects (Dixon 2017; Karnjanaprakorn
2017). At this point, every participant of the platform has an
incentive to increase platform growth, and thus profit from an
increase of the token value (Karnjanaprakorn 2017). Erickson
(2018) and Karnjanaprakorn (2017) assume this effect to lead
to faster platform growth and even to bigger platforms.
In the well-established research stream of MSPs,
blockchain-enabled tokens depict a novel phenomenon that
seems to introduce new dynamics in the process of platform
development. In this intersection, research only started to an-
alyse the interplay of existing knowledge and open research
questions (e.g., Chod et al. 2019; Kristoufek 2013; Reid and
Harrigan 2013). The majority of articles analysing token eco-
nomics and blockchain-based platforms are blogs and white
papers. Nevertheless, multi-billion-dollar industries base their
decisions on existing knowledge in the realm of token eco-
nomics and mechanisms of blockchain-based platforms.
Especially the potential financial incentive demands for a crit-
ical assessment of the supposed phenomenon. To date, studies
in this context are sparse. In this context, the paper at hand is a
first attempt to challenge the assumptions that utility tokens
enable platform-growth. The impact of tokenization and the
token value upside potential on blockchain-based platforms is
not only relevant for the scientific community, but also for
practitioners and potential investors. Against this backdrop,
we pose the following research question:
Can utility tokens issued on a blockchain-based platform
hold a financial incentive? And if so, what are the implications
for the adoption of these platforms?
To answer this research question, we model user incentives
in a two-sided blockchain-based platform where users (sellers
and buyers) interact to trade one certain good. The value de-
velopment of the platform’s token is the underlying factor
determining user incentives. We divide our model into two
distinct phases to investigate the value development over time.
In the first phase, P1, users of the platform can only buy to-
kens, but are not able to access the platform, e.g., the good.We
apply a qualitative-argumentative approach to explain chang-
es in token value and assess their impact on platform adoption.
In the second phase, P2, the platform launches, and sellers and
buyers start to trade.With the launch of the platform, the token
becomes a means of payment. For P2, we apply a monetary
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approach to model the token value. We use this model to
propose the conditions under which a financial incentive for
token owners exists. As a result, we derive two major propo-
sitions for the financial incentive on the platform usage.
Further, this paper is among the first to indicate that the sup-
posed financial incentive is not what it seems to be, but has a
two-faced character.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2
sets the theoretical foundations of the platform economy and
the token & blockchain economy. In section 3, we describe
our setting, model the token value and interpret the relation
between changes of the token value and platform adoption. In
section 4, we provide an overall summary and discuss the
implications of our results for theory and practice. The con-
clusion and proposed future research topics complete the
paper.
Theoretical foundation
Platform economy
In the past years, several experts claimed an economic
paradigm shift from linear business models towards digital
platform economies (e.g., Brand 2017; Brousseau and
Penard 2007; Kenney and Zysman 2016). These digital
platforms, which only developed in the past decade, were
promoted by the trend of digitalization and originate from
non-digital platforms (de Reuver et al. 2018). Industrial
innovation management research interpreted platforms as
a stable core and a variable periphery (Baldwin and
Woodard 2009). From this concept resulted various oppor-
tunities for distributed development and innovation, e.g.,
through modularisation (Baldwin and Clark 2000;
Henderson and Clark 1990). This research stream has
categorised platforms with their regard to the production
process scope, and focused on platforms in terms of a ve-
hicle for modularization, such as supply-chain platforms or
capability exchange platforms (Gawer 2014). In contrast,
the characteristics of digital platforms led to multiple set-
tings of platform governance, so there is no single owner of
the core anymore (Henfridsson et al. 2014; de Reuver et al.
2018). In the remainder of this paper, we focus on MSPs as
enabler of direct interactions between two or more distinct
sides, whereas each side is affiliated with a digital platform
(Hagiu and Wright 2015). MSPs differ from other
platform-like interactions between participants, such as a
vertical integration (e.g., an organization operates and sells
goods via a platform), reselling (e.g., an organization buys
goods or services and sells them to a customer), or input
supply (e.g., an organization buys goods from a supplier
and sales them) (Hagiu and Wright 2015). MSP providers
like Amazon mediate product or service interactions be-
tween different platform participants who need each other
in some way (e.g., consumers and suppliers). Once
established, MSPs impose high entry barriers on potential
competitors (Kenney and Zysman 2016; Zhu and Iansiti
2012).
In recent decades, a large number of different MSPs
developed in a variety of markets (Evans 2003; Hagiu
2007). If there are several platforms competing for the
same market, consumers can participate in multiple plat-
forms in order to obtain the maximal network benefits
(Choi 2010). Research differentiates between the affilia-
tion of participants to one (single-homing) or more than
one platform (multiple-homing) (Rochet and Tirole 2003).
A popular example for multi-homing is the market for
credit cards that splits into various platforms (e.g.,
MasterCard, VISA): most of the merchants around the
world accept more than one credit card, and most of the
consumers carry at least one of the two. Consequently,
both sides of the platform pursue multi-homing. In two-
or multi-sided markets, multi-homing ties platforms to-
gether and increases the total surplus, as competition in
the respective platforms affects each other and consumers
access the content associated with it (Belleflamme and
Peitz 2019; Choi 2010).
The challenge for all MSPs is to incentivize the various
sides to join the platform. In MSPs, participants benefit
from platform participation, and from direct and indirect
network effects. Through their participation, participants
can either sell or buy the underlying product or service
(they are part of the platform). The direct effect is the
value for a participant that results from other participants
of the same side to participate on the platform as well
(Shapiro and Varian 1999). Indirect network effects occur
when the value obtained by one kind of platform partici-
pant (buyer) increases with the numbers of the other kind
of platform participant (seller), or vice versa (Shapiro and
Varian 1999). Consequently, platform owners face the
challenge of low platform participation at an early stage
of platform development, and accompanying low platform
utility for (potential) platform participants.
To date, research in the realm of platform economy mainly
focused on the perspectives of platform owners and sellers.
For instance, Parker and van Alstyne (2009) describe six chal-
lenges in platform licensing and open innovation. Parker and
van Alstyne (2018) analyse the challenge of the right degree
of openness from a platform owners perspective in regard to
platform developers’ intellectual property rights. Further, re-
search evaluates the effects of innovation on and within plat-
forms (Evans et al. 2008; Hargadon 2008; Weitzman 1998).
However, Blockchain technology is considered to change the
established market rules of platform development (e.g., to
overcome the “chicken and egg” problem), and therefore
may d i s rup t the t r ad i t i ona l p l a t fo rm economy
(Karnjanaprakorn 2017; Lindman et al. 2017; Walter 2017).
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The opportunity to incorporate user incentives in the develop-
ment phase and to apply token offerings can change traditional
findings and calls for further analysis. So far, existing research
has not addressed this presumption.
Blockchain & token economy
Blockchain is a peer-to-peer protocol for transactional data,
which is decentralized, transparent, time-stamped and shared
across a network of untrusted participants (Xu et al. 2017). It is
said to allow for disintermediation as intermediaries no longer
need to verify transactions. In this network, trust in the under-
lying code and consensus rules replaces trustworthiness in the
intermediaries (Catalini and Gans 2016). Those consensus
rules are part of the underlying blockchain protocol and con-
firm each transaction on the particular blockchain (Zheng
et al. 2017). There are several consensus mechanisms, e.g.,
“proof-of-work” and “proof-of-stake” (King and Nadal
2012; Xu et al. 2017).
In recent years, further blockchain protocols developed,
such as the Ethereum blockchain (Buterin 2014). This so-
called second generation blockchain provides a programma-
ble infrastructure based on a Turing-complete programming
language enabling “smart contracts” (Buterin 2014; Szabo
1997). Smart contracts are programs that allow different par-
ticipants to carry out transactions securely as the correct exe-
cution of these programs is verified by a consensus protocol.
One application of smart contracts is the possibility to issue
tokens on top of a blockchain application (Beck et al. 2016;
Catalini and Gans 2016; Xu et al. 2017).
Tokens are a medium of exchange used to purchase various
goods, services, or privileges (Swan 2015). In a blockchain
network, network participants use digital tokens for various
purposes, e.g., as an internal unit of account, for the verification
of block-writing, as a facilitation of transactions, or for more
creative use cases such as preventing unintended use of the
blockchain, or granting token owners access (Conley 2017;
Fridgen et al. 2018; Glaser 2017; Schweizer et al. 2017)).
It is fundamental to distinguish between native tokens (e.g.,
Bitcoin) inherent to a blockchain protocol and on-chain tokens
(e.g., Golem or DataBroker) issued on top of a blockchain
using smart contracts (Buterin 2014; Kuo Chuen 2017).
There are various types of on-chain tokens. In the following,
we analyse asset-backed tokens and utility tokens, since these
are the most common types (Asanov 2018; Pietrewicz 2017).
Asset-backed tokens build cryptographic representation of tra-
ditional assets such as equity, gold, or even a fiat currency.
Therefore, the token value is linked to the value of the under-
lying (Oliveira et al. 2018). Utility tokens on the other hand
grant access to digital services or products (Michael et al.
2018). The tokens represent a means of payment on the plat-
form and can be traded on secondary markets (Pietrewicz
2017). In contrast to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin that serve
as a cross-platform means of payment, the issuer of utility
tokens limits their use to the respective platform
(Katalyse.io. 2018).
The initial distribution of on-chain tokens can take place in
several ways. First, the issuing entity can spread the tokens for
free to owners of specific cryptocurrencies as part of its mar-
keting strategy in a process called airdrop (Harrigan et al.
2018). Second, developers of a blockchain project can earn
tokens as a giveaway (Ehrsam 2016b). Third, the issuing en-
tity can distribute tokens in Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) in
exchange for a payment of fiat currency or cryptocurrency.
Usually, the sale process serves to finance an underlying
blockchain project (Conley 2017). ICOs became a popular
alternative to traditional financing methods for organizations
(Bachmann et al. 2019; Boreiko and Sahdev 2018; Fridgen
et al. 2018; Li and Mann 2018; Schweizer et al. 2017).
In recent months, researchers started to evaluate the oppor-
tunity of said tokens to foster platform development. The idea
is that early platform adopters can participate on the financial
success of a platform. Bakos and Halaburda (2019) develop a
model to investigate the use of tradable tokens to solve this
coordination problem, and find that platform-specific tokens
can aide to overcome the coordination problem in a platform
development setting. Their findings indicate that the extraor-
dinary reduction in transaction costs and the increase in
functionality, awareness, popularity, and acceptance results
in increasing application of these tokens. Li and Mann
(2018) underpin this finding and warn against a universal
ban of ICOs (e.g., China, South Korea), since tokens can serve
as a part of the platform’s operational process of building up
user interactions. Chen (2018) analyses the potential democ-
ratization of entrepreneurship and innovation associated with
blockchain tokens. He points out that the blockchain technol-
ogy may enable entrepreneurs to raise funds directly, democ-
ratize access to financial capital, give investors the opportuni-
ty to invest in early-stage projects, restructure fundraising and
investing, and facilitates user and developer communities.
Modelling tokenization of the platform economy
For the analysis of the potential financial incentive, we devel-
op a simplified model of a blockchain-based platform, inves-
tigate the effects of tokenization in two distinct, consecutive
phases (P1, P2) of the developing platform, and interpret con-
sequences on platform adoption.
Model set-up
Our subject of interest is the development of a platform that
allows a two-sided market where buyers and sellers of a cer-
tain good (or service) interact. Behind the platform, a
platform-building entity (e.g., one or multiple corporate or
non-profit organizations) drives the development. The
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platform is blockchain-based, which means that all platform
transactions are stored on the underlying blockchain. Further,
the platform has its own means of payment, a blockchain-
based utility token (on-chain). For simplification, we restrict
the number of goods on the platform to one. This good is also
purchasable on markets outside of this platform (i.e., multi-
homing).
Before the platform is accessible to users, the platform
building entity issues tokens with the aid of smart contracts
(e.g., during an ICO. For a detailed description of design
parameters for ICOs, please cf. Bachmann et al. 2019,
Fridgen et al. 2018). The tokens are for sale in exchange for
a fiat currency. The proceeds of the sale serve to finance the
further development of the platform. The entity issues a fixed
number of tokens that will not change at any later point in time
(fixed token supply). The issued token is the only means of
payment on the platform. Nevertheless, the token is convertible
in exchange for a fiat currency or cryptocurrency on a second-
ary market. There are no transaction costs on the platform and
on the secondary market. Furthermore, there is no interest rate.
In the following, we separate the analysis of token value
development into two distinct phases to answer our research
question. This is important to account for the change in the
token characteristics between the two phases (cf. Fig. 1). In P1,
the platform is not launched and not accessible for users yet.
Thus, the token is not a means of payment since no trade takes
place on the platform. P2 begins with the launch of the plat-
form. After this point in time, buyers and sellers can access the
platform and exchange the good for the token. Hence, in P2
the token is a means of payment and thus valuated as such.
Fig. 1 visualizes the phases P1 and P2.
P1 – before launch
P1 starts with the token sale. The issuing entity sets the initial
token price at an appropriate level.1 At this point, the platform
is still in the development phase, thus no trade of the good
takes place on the platform yet. This raises the question why a
potential platform user should purchase the token during this
phase. This is important since the token has no inherent value
just because of its technical creation (Glaser 2017). According
to Cong et al. (2018), the purchase decision of a token depends
on both the expected platform utility and the expected future
token price. If potential platform participants believe that the
platform and the traded good are useful in the future and the
price for a token is adequate, they buy tokens in the future. If
they further believe that the token value increases, they buy
the token at the earliest possible moment to profit from the
increase of the token value.
The upside potential of the token value inevitably leads to
the following question: How to determine the value develop-
ment of a token, which cannot yet fulfil its intended purpose?
To the best of our knowledge, there is no scientifically accept-
ed approach for such a valuation. Since the token is not a
means of payment before P2, a valuation as such (e.g., based
on a monetary model) is inappropriate. Following this argu-
mentation, we expect supply and demand to drive the token
value. Since our model assumes fixed token supply, the token
value will increase if the demand is higher than the supply.
As a result, we suspect a self-fulfilling prophecy: If suffi-
cient potential users have confidence in the platform and the
token, they buy tokens to be part of the platform and expect a
financial profit, because the token value increases with the
increasing number of platform participants. This finding is
also in line with Lee et al. (2018), who find that aggressive
first-day token subscriptions by institutional investors drive
token sales and lead to successful ICOs. Fig. 2 visualizes the
decision alternatives for potential token buyers.
P2 – after launch
With the successful platform launch, the second phase of plat-
form adoption begins. At this point, the good is tradeable on
the platform and the token is exchangeable in return for the
good. Thus, the token characteristic changes to a means of
payment and needs to be valued as such. Therefore, we apply
a monetary approach to determine the exchange rate between
the token and a fiat currency.
This monetary approach to determine the exchange rate
bases on the purchasing power parity (PPP) as well as the
quantity theory of money (QTM). QTM links the money
economy to the real economy and postulates a direct effect
of money supply on the price level in an economy (Tsoulfidis
2008). In combination with the theory of PPP, monetary ap-
proaches use the QTM to determine the long run equilibrium
Phase P1: Platform development
Platform is not launched yet and not 
accessible for trade and use
No interaction on the platform
Phase P2: Platform operation
Platform is launched and accessible 
Exchange of the underlying good is 
possible
The token becomes a means of payment
P
la
tf
or
m
 
la
un
ch
Fig. 1. Phases of platform development
1 Our analysis focuses on the token value development to derive implications
on user incentives. Consequently, we consider the token’s value changes. For
this purpose, the initial token value is of inferior importance.
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exchange rate, such as the flexible-price monetary model
(Frenkel 1977). The application of this approach to the valu-
ation of a utility token is in line with the recommendation of
Vitalik Buterin, who proposes to apply the monetary equation
of exchange to value a medium-of-exchange token (Buterin
2017). In many blog articles other authors follow this recom-
mendation, using QTM to value a token (e.g., Beaman 2018;
Burniske 2017; Evans 2018; Kilroe 2017).
In a first step, we consider the QTM equation of exchange,
MV = PQ, whereM is the money supply, V the velocity of the
money circulation, P is the price level, andQ is the quantity of
the resources provided (Newcomb 1913). The price level is
expressed as:
P ¼ MV
Q
ð1Þ
Adapting this model to tokens, the definition of the variables
changes as follows:M is the total token supply, which is a fixed
number; V is the velocity of the token circulation, that is, the
average number of transactions a token performs within a spec-
ified unit of time; P is the price of the single good exchanged on
the platform; and Q is the amount of this good provided. It is
important to note that P is not the price for the token itself. The
price of the token is expressed by an exchange rate φ to a fiat
currency. Following the theory of PPP, this exchange rate is:
φ ¼ P
f
P
; ð2Þ
where Pf is the price of the good outside of the blockchain-based
platform measured in the fiat currency. Putting formula (1) and
(2) together, the exchange rate φ of a token to a fiat currency can
be determined by:
φ ¼ P
f Q
MV
ð3Þ
As such, we express the token value by four parameters:
three internal to the characteristics of the blockchain-based
platform and one external to the platform, the platform-
external price of the good measured in a fiat currency.
Based on this definition of the token value φ, we consider the
impact of a marginal token value change. To do so, we split P2
into two distinct periods (t1, t2). φ can only change from the first
to the second period, i.e., is constant in t1 and t2. Thus, a change
in value from one period to the other can be ascertained by:
Δφ ¼ φt2−φt1 ð4Þ
If Δφ is positive, the token owner profits from a financial
gain, hence, has an incentive to hold the token (i.e., keep it as
an investment). If Δφ is negative, the token value decreases
and the token owner has no incentive to hold the token.
In the following, we analyse under which circumstances
Δφ > 0, and thus, the token holds a financial incentive. For this
purpose, we look at changes in one of the parameters ofφ, while
holding the other three values constant. Δφ > 0 if Q rises, ceteris
paribus, i.e., when the amount of the good traded on the platform
increases from t1 to t2. This is the case when more participants
join the platform, and thus more trade takes place. Δφ is also
positive whenPfrises, ceteris paribus, e.g., because the price level
of a foreign market decreases, or V decreases, ceteris paribus,
e.g., due to external shocks (for a more detailed discussion of
the QTM and its components, please refer to Friedman 2017;
Woodford 2011). SinceM is fixed, it has no influence on Δφ.
To assess whether Δφ affects platform adoption we determine
the platform usage. The platform usage depends on the purchase
decision of every buyer for the traded good on the platform.
Therefore, we take a closer look at the purchase decision in t1
of a buyerwho already holds tokens. A purchase decision usually
depends on thewillingness to payw for the good and on the price
P of the good. P is the price measured in tokens the buyer has to
pay on the platform, not to be confused with Pf. Ifw ≥P, a utility
maximizing consumer buys the good. However, on a tokenized
platform, the purchase decision does not only depend on w. As
the means of payment on the platform is the token, the buyer of
the good has to use this token to pay for the good. Therefore, the
buyer must also consider whether he is missing a potential finan-
cial gain if he uses the token to buy the good. Hence, the depen-
dencies of the purchase decision on a tokenized platform change
as follows:
w−xΔφ≥P; ð5Þ
with x representing the number of tokens needed to pay for the
good.
Phase P1: Platform development Phase P2: Platform operation
Buy
No buy
Buy
No buy
Sell
Use
Fig. 2. Decision alternatives for potential token buyers
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The following states occur:
& If Δφ = 0, there is no incentive to hold the tokens and the
purchase decision solely depends on w and P.
& If Δφ < 0, the token owner would suffer a loss of value of
his tokens. Therefore, the token owner has a higher incen-
tive to buy the good in t1 than in t2.
& If Δφ > 0, the token owner benefits from an increase in
token value, which is tantamount to a financial incentive
to hold the tokens. Hence, the token owner faces the ques-
tion whether to keep the tokens and benefit from this fi-
nancial gain, or to use the tokens to buy the good while
losing the potential gain. Thus, if Δφ > 0, w is reduced by
Δφ. A reduction in the willingness to pay leads to a lower
demand in the market overall and to a decline in platform
usage.
If PPP holds, an increase in φ, and thus a positive Δφ leads
to a higher purchasing power in t2. In other words, this corre-
sponds with a decline in the price level for the good and thus
to the typical characteristics of deflation. Following this anal-
ysis, the financial gain for the token owner associated with a
positive change in token value has a negative effect on the
platform overall. As the token owner decides between holding
and using the token, the financial incentive to hold the token
lowers the willingness to pay for the good. Thus, the overall
demand for the good declines and results in a negative effect
for sellers. This implies that a growth in trading volume from
t1 to t2 (i.e., platform usage) leading to a higher token valua-
tion has a direct negative impact on demand for the good in t1.
Demonstration
In the following example, we aim to provide further illustration
of the model application: Let’s consider a platform that allows
users to transfer money to other users of the platform. In ex-
change for every transaction, the user is charged one token.
The platform building entity issues the tokens before the launch
of the platform and sets an initial token price. Potential users
become buyers of these tokens under the following conditions:
First, buyers expect the transferral of money via this platform to
be useful in the future. Second, the token price is adequate. Third,
buyers expect the token price to rise in the near future, as they
would otherwise defer their purchase until the platform launch. If
these conditions result in a token purchase, a supply and demand
consideration leads to the conclusion that the value of the token
will increase. Therefore, even before the token is usable to trans-
fer money via the platform, its value increases due to the fact that
buyers believe in the growth of the platform.
After the launch of the platform, a token owner has three
options: First, use the token to transfer money. Second, sell the
token. Third, hold the token. A utility maximizing token owner
has to weigh the benefits of a transaction via the platform against
the upside potential of the token value. As monetary theory im-
plies, the token value increases inter alia, if more users join the
platform and more transactions take place. If the token owner
believes in further platform growth, his potential financial gain in
the future from selling the token at a higher price outweighs his
benefits from using the token in the present at some point. If this
consideration applies to multiple platform users, the expectation
of future platform growth will hinder platform activity.
Overarching results and implications
In the following, we present two propositions that we derived
from the observable phenomena and emphasize on the
resulting implications for theory and practice.
Proposition 1: The blockchain-enabled tokenization of
MSPs offers a financial incentive for platform users during
platform development.
Our approach suggests a positive financial incentive in P1. If
enough platform participants believe in a positive token value
development, the self-fulfilling prophecy seems to overcome the
“chicken and egg” problem. Expecting a financial profit, the
assumed value increase incentivizes potential platform partici-
pants to buy tokens, and thus to join the platform in P1.
Therefore, the platform obtains a first user base without the need
for high investments by the platform building entity. The entity
even receives financing for the platform development through
the collected capital. Furthermore, the token owners have an
incentive to grow the platform in order to profit from a rise in
token value. Therefore, token owners and the entity work togeth-
er toward a common goal: the appreciation of the platform and an
increase of the token value. This leads to an alignment of incen-
tives between the token owners and the entity. Nevertheless, a
mere financial incentive to join the platform and accelerate plat-
form growth can also have negative consequences. Initial studies
suggest that the incentive structures described may encourage
market manipulation such as “pump-and-dump” schemes (e.g.,
Corbet et al. 2018; Li and Mann 2018).
These findings for the platform development have relevant
implications for research: First, the financial upside potential of
tokens represents an incentive to join MSPs and thus extends
existing literature on network effects and platform development
in general. Second, the understanding of these additional incen-
tive structures and dynamics need further sharpening in the
future and thus offer a possible direction for future research.
Regarding its practical implications, tokenization is of special
interest to every platform building intention as it could poten-
tially solve one of themajor problems of platform development.
Proposition 2: The increasing number of platform partici-
pants results in an increase of the token value during platform
operation. However, a utility maximizing consumer has to
weigh the benefits of a transaction on the platform against
the upside potential of the token value.
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If the token owner believes in further platform growth during
platform operation, his potential financial gain from selling the
token at a higher price in the future will at some point outweigh
his benefits from using the platform. Based on this proposition,
the expectation of future platform growth during platform oper-
ation will inhibit platform usage in the long run. This proposition
is not in line with the proposition that existing research and blog
articles follow. For the academic audience, these findings suggest
that the incorporation of user incentives in the context of
blockchain-based tokenization of MSPs is necessary. Our work
expands the existing literature on MSPs by capturing financial
utility alongside network effects. As our findings propose, the
financial incentive is two-faced, and urgently needs further anal-
ysis for a deeper understanding. The research study at hand calls
for evaluation of the token economy and can serve as a starting
point. For the practice-oriented audience, our findings suggest
that a careful application of token-financed platform develop-
ment is necessary. Interestingly, the majority of the currently
highest rated tokens are of deflationary design (Kaal 2018),
which increases the relevance of our research contribution. We
can only explain the dimensions of this phenomenon by assum-
ing that most of the token issuing entities neglect the concepts of
monetary theory, even though the intent of the token is a means
of payment. Nevertheless, as Conley (2017) already pointed out,
designing a successful token requires to consider common as-
pects of monetary theory, financial economics, and game theory.
This includes a simple mechanism derived by the equation of
exchange: the supply of money has to grow with the economic
activity. Otherwise, the economy cannot grow, which reflects our
results from P2. Hence, token issuing entities need to consider
this proposition if they want to establish a sustainable economic
cycle on their platform and avoid “pump and dump” schemes.
We emphasize that Proposition 2 neither reflects nor ex-
plains short-term market developments, e.g., it does not apply
to exceptional market phases: First, a simultaneous increase in
token value and platform usage can occur during a hype.
However, first empirical analysis suggest that the median
ICO destroys value of its token holders on average after half
a year (Haffke and Fromberger 2018; Momtaz 2019). Second,
Proposition 2 only applies if the financial incentive is the
rationale for platform participation. It’s conceivable to have
a simultaneous increase in token value and platform partici-
pation for MSPs designed for illegal activities, which is a
pressing issue in the blockchain community (Shoshitaishvili
et al. 2014; Smith and Weismann 2014; van Hout and
Bingham 2014). For instance, almost half of all bitcoin trans-
actions have an illegal background (Foley et al. 2019).
Furthermore, we suspect a relation between Proposition 2
and Proposition 1 that we did not incorporate in our model.
When users observe the same patterns across different plat-
forms, this might also affect users trust in the platform devel-
opment. Consequently, this observation can reduce the initial-
ly expected utility from platform participation, and further
reduce the deflationary effect in P2. Future studies should
analyse this effect with a focus on empirical data.
Conclusion and future research
Despite the growing interest from academia and practice in
blockchain technology and tokens, theoretical knowledge on
the effects of tokenization is scarce. Based on our research
question, we investigated the implications of the application
of blockchain-enabled tokens on the adoption of MSPs. For
this purpose, we analysed the token value in two distinct
phases of platform development and determined under which
circumstances a token provides a financial incentive. To the
best of our knowledge, the paper at hand is the first of its kind
that distinguishes and analyses a possible financial incentive
of tokens in different phases of platform development. This
analysis is relevant for both theory and practice to approach
further questions regarding the setup of ICOs.
We assess the financial incentive on platform adoption and
provide a differentiated understanding of the effects of
tokenization. Our findings imply that combining a financial
incentive with a means of payment on a MSP leads to a con-
tradictory effect: while the financial incentive first enables
platform growth and helps to overcome the initial “chicken
and egg” problem, it inhibits platform growth once the plat-
form launches due to its deflationary character. We want to
point out that the token value potentially decreases once the
platform is accessible, as the token value’s upside potential
hinders the token usage. We believe that this study is theoret-
ically and practically relevant, and hope that it provides fellow
researchers with a foundation for continuing their research on
blockchain technology, MSPs and the effects of tokenization.
As any research endeavour, limitations beset our work. First,
we restricted our token valuation analysis to simple input factors.
Since the blockchain is still a relatively young technology, only
few financial instruments address this technology. Future re-
search should build a more complex token valuation method to
take more aspects of monetary theory into account as soon as
sufficient empirical information is available. Such future research
could incorporate other aspects of financial theory or shareholder
incentives, e.g., by applying option pricing theory, or financial
theory on shareholder incentives. Second, we assumed that the
PPP holds to model the token value. However, PPP is only given
for a good or service that is tradeable with foreign markets
(Balassa 1964). As the blockchain technology holds the potential
for new business models, it is likely that the good or service is
only accessible on the blockchain-based platform and cannot be
traded outside the platform (i.e., single-homing). This strengthens
the necessity for more complex valuation methods in future re-
search. Third, we did not investigate the implications of declining
user activity on token value. Future research should develop an
economic equilibrium model for token valuation, putting an in-
crease in user numbers with a decrease of user activities in
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relation. Fourth, we only focused on the buyer-side behaviour in
the two-sided market. Future research should also assess the
seller-side and derive implications of an increase in token value
on the behaviour of a seller. In addition, further considerations on
risk attitudes of the buyers and sellers towards the token value
upside potential would be desirable.
Our findings regarding the effects of a financial incentive
on platform adoption can also stimulate further empirical stud-
ies. We suggest an inhibition of platform usage and provide a
foundation for future research dedicated to proving an effect
of a change in token value on platform adoption. As soon as
sufficient long-term data development of token exchange rates
and platform growth is available, research should shift its fo-
cus to this empirical effect. These studies may generate valu-
able insights for practice and help to identify sustainable token
designs. Future research should also focus on developing to-
ken designs that accelerate platform growth without the con-
tradictory effect of current token designs.
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